China's Perspectives on the International Order: How Should the EU Proceed?

Acknowledgments

No policy report is a self-contained work, let alone one concerning China and the scope and complexity of the international order. I draw upon the intellectual contributions of several distinguished peers. In addition, eight Chinese experts generously shared their insights and time through virtual semi-structured interviews on a non-attributive basis. These experts were: Chu Shulong and Da Wei, professors at Tsinghua University; Xue Li, professor at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Li Wenhong, professor at the Beijing Foreign Studies University; Ding Yifan, professor at Renmin University; Wang Yong, professor at Peking University; and Zhao Minghao and Li Bo, professors at Fudan University. Leiden University’s Emeritus Professor of Public International Law John Dugard and Martin Jacques also kindly shared their insights. I cannot thank these experts enough.

I also owe gratitude to the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung for sponsoring research on a critical subject. The better we all understand different perspectives of actors, large and small, on the international order, the better we can, cooperatively, advance its legitimacy, sustain what works, and improve what may not. At the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, I would particularly like to thank Canan Kus for her efforts to realize this project, Adriana Yee Meyberg, Jan Turowski, and other colleagues who have contributed to publishing this report. Any flaws in this report are of my own making.

Foreword

In a time of change and instability, when concepts such as international order and multipolarism are being tossed around, it is important that we take a closer look at the dynamics of this new world. This study is the result of a close endeavor between the Asia Department of the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung and Richard Ghiasy, born out of the need to shed light on a subject that is confronted with new facets on a global scale every day.

The international order as we know it, is a phenomenon of comparatively recent history, and therefore subject to constant progress and change. As the world community progresses, with more and more sovereign countries emerging and engaging in international exchange, current power structures are in a state of dispute. A special role plays China, as the values, principles, rules and norms of this international order are increasingly challenged by non-Western civilizational, geopolitical and intellectual perspectives. It should be inevitable that we too, from a leftist perspective, analyse and criticise the world order, which emerged more out of necessity after the Second World War and whose structures have hardly changed since then.

In this time of global disorder, it is particularly important to identify spaces where new fields of action can emerge—often with progressive, and leftist approaches. This could offer us new possibilities for transformative approaches amidst the current crises. In the fragmentation of global power structures, opportunities arise to explore alternative pathways for international cooperation and solidarity. Such spaces could hold the potential to develop new forms of interaction, challenging the existing hegemonic structures and advocating for a more just world order. By leveraging these emerging opportunities, we can lay the groundwork for new alliances and strategies that not only critique the prevailing systems, but also actively construct alternatives rooted in equality and mutual respect. This is the moment for us to engage in shaping a multipolar world, where diverse perspectives and voices can contribute to a more equitable global future.

The discussions that this study aims to initiate are of utmost importance. It is time to fill the terms like multipolarism and international order with content. We hope that this study will serve as a basis for numerous discussions and look forward to be actively involved in several of them.

 

Canan Kus
Beijing Office
Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, China

Executive Summary

Never in history have we had the scope and degree of international order that we currently enjoy — the US-led role of the West in this should be acknowledged. But, as a matter of fact, international order is a recent phenomenon. It is, therefore, a continuous work in progress in the early internationalist stages. With China leading the way, the international order’s values, principles, norms, rules, and rule-making framework are increasingly probed through non-Western civilizational, (geo)political, and intellectual lenses while the world’s civilizations and societies interact on a standing that is somewhat more equal. The world has become less acquiescing.

 

China’s perspectives on the international order revolve around three prevailing discontents: first, the West’s politically liberal labelling and indoctrination; second, the West’s hegemony that is spearheaded by the US; and third, US-led collective security alliances and institutions. The first discontent has two underpinnings: the international order should not be labelled liberal as only a minority of member states are liberal democracies, and the international order is not genuinely liberal. China argues that the West does not acknowledge and respect the world’s civilizational and cultural plurality and, therefore, does not respect diversity in socio-political models, values, and traditions. Thus, China asks: is the order genuinely liberal and democratic?

 

The second discontent states that the current order possesses the hegemonic mentality of the US, lacking fairness and genuine openness, and has clear geographic boundaries. China sees the international order as being mostly economically catered to the West, with the US
acting as the gatekeeper. In essence, China’s perspective is that US hegemony is the end,
US strength is the foundation, and international institutions such as the Bretton Woods’
IMF and World Bank and US-led security institutions are the tools of this international order. The third discontent is that, according to China, US-led collective security alliances and institutions go against the spirit and letter of cooperative security dictated by the UN Charter. Orders have traditionally been instruments against rivals and threats, and the US-led liberal international order still maintains binary and schismatic characteristics from the Cold War. Similarly, China dismisses “rules-based international order” of the US and its allies as an approach that seeks to impose chimeric rules that serve their interests.

 

What, then, are China’s preferences for an international order that would be more legitimate and fairer? China does not prefer to overturn the current international order or build a parallel one, and it isn’t able to do so. China seems to know its limits: it has neither capacity nor legitimacy. Moreover, the order has served China very well. Besides the creation of a new balance, the order needs to be upgraded to deal with new global challenges and does not need to be substituted completely. Importantly, China suggests no single civilization or cohort should dominate the international order; instead, it claims that an infusion of the wisdom and principles of multiple civilizations and cultures will strengthen its foundations and legitimacy. China is the only significant power that — at least rhetorically — has proposed such inclusive thinking for the world and the international order to such a comprehensive and explicit degree.

 

Some might be astonished to learn that China is thus attempting to “liberate” and “democratize” the international order. Even though China, like most significant powers, might bend rules, especially on a regional level, when core interests are at stake, China prefers order and rules, too: to be specific, it prefers an international order based on the UN system and Charter and underpinned by international law. Rather than focusing on rules, China promotes “new” ideals, values, principles, and norms revolving around equality, diversity, cooperation, development, and cooperative security. These reiterate and, in some cases, even improve upon the UN Charter. This makes China a conservationist of the UN system and Charter as well as of an open economic order and international law, while also being a partial reformist of the prevailing political and security order. The triad of Global Civilization, Global Security, and Global Development initiatives backed by the vision of a “shared future of mankind” are the guidelines to improve international order.

 

China proposes that the international community revisit the drawing table with regards to international order, claiming that this should have been done in 1991, as the current order that is democratically deficient and fraught needs egalitarian input and updating. In response to China’s three discontents, the country’s three primary suggestions for reform are: 1. make the international order politically value-neutral so that it no longer has a binary, divisive, and derogatory nature; 2. make it economically egalitarian by reforming the rule-making framework in the IMF, World Bank, and WTO; and 3. promote collective security that is cooperative rather than binary.

 

How, then, should the EU respond? In a world that is less acquiescing and more restless midst the transformation from unipolarity to multipolarity, China’s perspective and preferences for reform are likely to resonate with many nations, particularly in the often-impoverished Global South. The EU cannot cling to the past; the international order is a work in progress. The liberal international order that served the EU appears to only be the first chapter in the international order’s book that is still being written. For the first time in history, all the world’s societies interact frequently and profoundly. Several countries, including China and India, have found more self-confidence and agency. China’s calls for reform are not irrational and reflect the world’s civilizational, cultural, socio-political, and economic polarity and diversity. Importantly, China is also in favour of an order based on rules. It is a given that it is better to deal with such a plurality and suggestions for improvement through negotiated institutional, principal, and normative change than through conflict. Moreover, the longer the EU waits, the more it risks being seen as resistant to change by non-Western nations.

The EU is uniquely positioned to support the reform of a fraying international order because it is part of the perceived problem. This order is not only challenged by its members, including members of the West, but also has inherent contradictions and faults that are cracking open. The longer the EU waits, the larger the cracks may become, risking further fraying of the international order. Furthermore, the EU should welcome internationalist reforms because a more legitimate and functioning international order may put some restraints on Chinese and US power and their conflict. The time has come for the EU to consider a politically neutral international order and less dominance in key institutions. As a guiding principle, it should develop its vision for a political, economic, and security international order that is more internationalist and egalitarian. European civilization possesses enough classical and contemporary wisdom and sophistication for such egalitarianism. This vision will need proposals to advance the international order’s legitimacy, sustain what works, and provide suggestions and actions for reform for what does not. Keeping in mind that the current international order was created in a balance of power that was favourable to Europe after World War Two, listening, compromise, and action are imperative in a multipolar world. Similarly, it is critical that this endeavour not become a clash of civilizations. It must proceed through dialogue, understanding, cooperation, and fusion.

Introduction

The scope and degree of international order that we currently have is something we have never enjoyed. This order deserves recognition, principally for its primary architect and upholder, the US-led West, but, of course, also for all other contributing participants. The international order is not flawless in design or practice, of course. Nor is it truly international, sincerely liberal, or always orderly. The international order is — and can only be — a work in progress. Since international relations are dynamic, international order cannot be static either. It is subject to continuous waxing and waning as rules are strengthened or bent, power shifts or diffuses, new interpretations and principles emerge, technologies progress, and members expand or contract in spirit or letter through the multiple institutions, layers, and facets that comprise the international order. Thus, international order can be considered an organism that continuously transforms, not necessarily in a linear way or direction nor always at the same pace.

 

With this in mind, no one should take the international order for granted: to sustain and advance it requires continuous effort and attention by all states, organizations, citizens, and other stakeholders. The international order will not function on autopilot. This also means that all participants, including the order’s originators, need to reflect and be receptive to constructive critical reflection and reform to advance it. This policy report has been made precisely for these reasons.

 

The international order is gradually becoming a more prevalent subject in discussions among the policy, scholarly, and media communities. To a significant extent, these discussions stem from China’s re-emergence as a major power. Having transitioned from a pro-US and partly liberal stance during much of the first half of the twentieth century, and following decades of revolutionary zeal under Mao Zedong that was aimed at upending the international order dominated by the West, China, has undergone a dramatic shift in position and become one of the international order’s steadfast participants and upholders.

 

Yet, China is also a selective participant. It has called to reform the “liberal international order”, as it is also known, due to what it sees as new global challenges and changes, a global shift in power balance, and what China refers to as an “unfair order” that disproportionally favours the US-led West. Considering China’s increasing influence across virtually all metrics of power, China’s perspectives on the international order and any of their constructive suggestions should not fall on deaf ears — nor should anyone else’s for that matter. Why? The re-emergence of historical centres of power such as China, India, and parts of the Islamic World among others, as well as the rise of other demographic, economic, and political centres have not been accompanied by a commensurate voice in the international order. Such a lack of equal participation on the highest rungs and an absence of change fuel a sense of dissatisfaction, and this affects the international order’s perceived legitimacy. This is potentially hazardous. Indeed, actors in the Global South¹ increasingly question the legitimacy of the liberal international order or “rules-based international order” as it has recently been called by the US and some of their allies. China has taken the lead on this.

With a focus on China, this policy report answers two questions:
1. What foundations and manifestations of the international order are, in China’s perspective, illegitimate or unfair, and why?
2. What are China’s preferences for the international order and reform?

 

This report answers these two questions through the analysis of primary and secondary sources such as Chinese white papers and official statements, a review of Chinese and non-Chinese scholarly output, eight semi-structured virtual interviews on a non-attributive basis with Chinese experts on the subject, and one interview with an expert on international public law. The Chinese perspectives and preferences thus hover between the official, primarily, and scholarly. This aims of the report are to garner understanding for these perspectives and preferences with an open mind. The objectives of the author and this report are not to explicitly endorse or criticize these perspectives, preferences, and propositions for reform, but merely to identify and understand them. Similarly, whether China abides by these preferences or trespasses them in practice does not fall within the scope of this
report.

 

The report proceeds as follows. After a brief discussion of international order in Section 1 and a deep examination of China’s perspectives on the international order’s perceived illegitimacy and unfairness in Section 2, the report explores China’s preferences for the international order and reform in Section 3. Based on these findings, the report puts forward policy recommendations in Section 4 for the EU in support of an international order that is
more internationalist and egalitarian and that must consist of more global agreement than division. Let’s dive in.

 

1. Understanding the International Order

Key Findings
• International order is a recent phenomenon in history, in early internationalist stages, and a continuous work in progress.
• Orders were traditionally instrumentalized to deal with a common threat or rival, not to foster world peace: the liberal international order still has some of these binary and schismatic characteristics from the Cold War.
• Global consensus on the legitimacy of international order is partial: with China leading the way, values, principles, rules, and norms are increasingly probed through non-Western civilizational, (geo)political, and intellectual lenses.
• The Westphalian principles of sovereignty, equal standing, and non-interference are the only principles of universal, and thus also Chinese, agreement on international order.
• After the Cold War, the US-led West neglected to seek input from other global actors, including China, about their vision of and role in the international order.² In retrospect, this was a missed opportunity.

 

Before delving into China’s perspectives in Section 2, it is critical that we understand the international order. How did it come to be, what is it, and what is it made of?

 

1.1 Understanding the International Order

The current international order predates the involvement of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) — the PRC only acceded to the order’s core institution, the UN system, in 1971. To understand the current international order, we need to keep at least three critical historical facts in mind. First, international order is a recent phenomenon, and orders have traditionally been weapons and instruments against shared rivals and threats, not attempts to bring peace and harmony to the world.³ Before the First and Second World Wars, “international order”, or at least what most closely resembled it, was mainly characterized by empires, patron-client relationships, and colonies. These were, in fact, regional or bounded orders. The China-led East Asian order during the Ming (1368–1644) and early Qing Dynasties (1644–1912) is an example of a regional order, and the vast British colonial empire is an example of an international yet bounded order. Arguably, some of the strongest formal orders in modern history — the kingdoms’ Treaty of Westphalia in 1648,⁴ the Congress of Vienna in 1814–15, and the US-led West’s liberal order after World War Two that built on the ruins of previous orders — were not inclusive and did not work for the greater good of humanity. These were rather means to protect themselves and to suppress rivals.⁵ This, of course, also applies to the communist order led by the Soviet Union.

 

Second, the current international order, or the “Pax Americana” as it is also known, is not solely the creation of the twentieth century. And it is not exclusively built on and made by American power. The US does not embody the international order; it has a relationship with it, like everybody else.⁶ The origins of this order date some four centuries ago with what Princeton liberal international order expert John Ikenberry refers to as two long-term internationalist projects.⁷ The foundational project is the Treaty of Westphalia: a critical turning point for international relations. Before this treaty, interference within neighbours’ territories was common. The Treaty introduced a degree of equality and security, classifying states as equivalent sovereigns irrespective of strength, size, religion, or political system — all within a secularized legal framework.⁸ Of all the world’s concepts of order, the Westphalian principles are the only universally recognized foundation of the contemporary international order.⁹ As we will see later in this report, China also recognizes these principles as the foundation of international order. That said, the Treaty of Westphalia did not prevent colonization by European powers, including of China, nor the outbreak of wars, including two world wars. Nonetheless, it laid the groundwork for the UN Charter.

 

The other internationalist project primarily originates from British and then US liberal democracy, political interests, ideals, and international trade, including those of former US President Woodrow Wilson. These include typical liberal ideals and values: open markets, liberal democracy, individual rights, freedom of expression, thought, and religion, the rule of law, multilateralism, economic interdependence, and collective security. While these are ostensibly guided by the greater good of humanity and were advanced through multilateral institutions and international law, they have not always been applied with equal measure and understanding within the liberal international order or in respective foreign policies.

 

Third, it is important to remember that the current international order only became truly international after the end of the Cold War, not after World War Two. In the Cold War, there were two international but bounded orders, the Soviet-led Communist and the US-led West’s liberal order.¹⁰ Indicative of this bounded nature was China’s ability to switch between them. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the appeal and legitimacy of the US-led liberal order inevitably and instantly increased in scope and degree. After all, order rests ona balance between power and legitimacy.¹¹ There were no great powers other than the US at that time, and China had not yet re-emerged as one. With (the balance of) power heavily skewed in favour of the US-led West as well as evidence of a functional social contract under the auspices of liberal democracy and the tenets of capitalism, legitimacy for a US-led Western international order was easily gained, and most agreed to it, though not all. While liberal values and US hegemony were not universally embraced, national and material interests as well as a lack of alternatives provided justification for the support of this order, particularly in international trade. The order became a Western prescriptive effort to establish the principles of international politics for all states.¹² If one were to fast-forward, however, one might question how international today’s liberal international order truly was and is. After all, China, Russia, India, and a great number of other countries are not fully included¹³ in, for example, the US-led security alliances and institutions, the (liberal) G7, or the Summit for Democracy.¹⁴ What happened? For one, power politics. The liberal international order still carries some of the binary characteristics of the Cold War’s “free world versus the non-free world”. In this regard, this order is schismatic, which has an effect on legitimacy. Without perceived legitimacy, order frays, resentment thrives, and conflict looms.¹⁵ Unfortunately, at some point after the Cold War, the US-led West forgot to ask whether everyone else was entirely receptive to liberal values and a disproportionate role of the West — this was a missed opportunity.

 

Indeed, discontent with the US-led liberal international order quickly arose. China and Russia already expressed concern in 1997. In that year, they signed a joint declaration to promote multipolarity and to establish a “peaceful, stable, just, and rational new international order”.16 Interestingly, the first major and visible protests against the Western international order came from within the West when anti-globalists demonstrated actively in 1999.¹⁷ One potential reason for its decaying legitimacy is the absence of one of the primary drivers of the liberal international order, namely, defeating the threat of communism and the Soviet Union.¹⁸ Some of the sources of dissatisfaction are a result of US unilateralism, including the invasion of Iraq, Western military interventions in Libya, Syria, and other places, a laissez-faire stance towards Israel regarding Palestinians, capitalism/industrialization-induced climate change, and the ongoing struggle of the majority of the world’s countries to alleviate poverty. Yet, the international liberal order has contributed to several (socio-)economic success stories, including Japan, South Korea, substantial portions of Eastern and Central Europe, Singapore, Israel, Uruguay, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and, of course, China. So, the argument that this order exclusively serves Western countries is misguided. On the other hand, one Chinese interviewee has pointed out that “only those countries friendly with the US and serving US geopolitical purposes could thrive”,¹⁹ referring to the frontline states that counteracted the Soviet Union and the spread of communism. Nevertheless, the order has generally helped maintain peace: inter-state armed conflicts have dropped significantly since 1945.

 

Having touched upon the historical roots and broader contemporary discontent, we finally need to ask ourselves: how do we define international order? This is a topic of ample debate and limited consensus.20 It has a diverse spectrum of terminological and conceptual interpretations, including in China.²¹ Western politicians tend to refer to the liberal and rules-based international order loosely. Along with their application through institutions, values, principles, norms, the concepts of order and the international order are progressively examined through non-Western civilizational, (geo)political, and intellectual lenses.²² As one Chinese interviewee stresses, many look at the international order through a geopolitical lens, but it is also happening through a civilizational lens. There is a bias in social sciences and politics due to civilizational backgrounds.²³ History, including the legacy of colonialism
and ideology, is another factor. Hence, a RAND study aptly refers to China’s historic engagement with the international order as a “complex and often contradictory work in progress”. ²⁴

 

In this paper, we will adopt the following definition of international order: “an organized group of international institutions and corresponding principles, rules, and norms that help govern the interactions among the member states”.²⁵ This definition is value-neutral and has an ample bandwidth. But what is this group? It is the UN system from 1945 that is centred on the UN Charter for political and security ordering.²⁶ The Charter and the UN system
provide a general international law framework for its members. The UN system includes a network of bodies and arrangements that promote international cooperation, peace, and development. For economic and development ordering, the system revolves around the 1944 Bretton Woods institutions. These are the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the 1947 World Trade Organization (WTO).²⁷ These are in alignment with the UN system, although they operate somewhat autonomously. Finally, the corresponding rules and norms are underpinned by international law based on conventional multilateral treaty law and customary law.

 

1.2 Conclusions

Orders have traditionally been instruments against rivals and threats, not attempts to bring peace and harmony to the world. This was no different during the Cold War. After the Cold War, the first truly international order arose, even if all actors were not on equal footing or at the design table. For a brief period, as the world recuperated from the tensions of the Cold War and US power was historically unmatched, reflections and criticism on the international order appeared limited. With the re-emergence of traditional centres of power, primarily that of China and segments of the Global South, the legitimacy, fairness, and efficacy of the international order are increasingly questioned. Thus far, there is no consensus on what the international order and international law precisely constitute and what it should be. Both leave room for interpretation. This complicates analysis, constructive dialogue, and reform. Now, we will examine China’s perspective.

2. China's Perspective on the Interntional Order

Key Findings
• China believes that Western liberal values colour the international order without regard for perspectives, values, and principles from other civilizations, including China’s.
• China argues that the international order is not liberal as a system, with the partial exception of the economic order. Nor is it liberal with regards to the member states, as it does not reflect the world’s plurality and diversity in socio-political models, values, and economic development stages.
• China approaches the “rules-based international order” on a pick-and-chooserules-as-you-go basis.
• China’s prevailing discontents are: 1. the international order should not be indoctrinated as politically liberal; 2. The US-led West should not maintain hegemony, and 3. US-led security alliances and institutions are not part of the international order and go against the UN Charter.
• China is increasingly challenging the US position in the international order, but not necessarily an international order based on rules. In a sense, China attempts to “liberate” and “democratize” the international order by making values, and decision-making and rule-making processes more egalitarian.

 

Section 2 examines China’s official and scholarly views on the international order, specifically the liberal international order, recently also known as the “rules-based international order”. It looks particularly at the Chinese perspective on (il)legitimacy and fairness. It begins with China’s general perspective before delving into specific prevailing discontents.

2.1 Perspectives

China takes exception to the current international order because it feels that, in practice, the US-led West deviates too far away from the spirit and principles of the UN Charter and system as well as the UN’s central role in political and security domains that were initiated by the US and the United Kingdom in Bretton Woods in 1944. We should take note here that China’s experience with and perspective on international relations are shorter and different than many of the Western powers.²⁸ For much of its history, imperial China barely had to deal with a balance of power. Its experience as an active participant in the US-led liberal international order is just over four decades, and even within that period, China, as its 2001 WTO accession shows, was a partial member. Today, China argues that the international community established the post-war international order and that it should be jointly run, not dominated by a Western, post-Cold War cohort. ²⁹

Chinese leadership recognizes that China has been a major beneficiary of the international order that the US-led West (co-)created and that it has helped foster peace and prosperity
since World War Two.30 China has thrived since the end of the Cold War. Without trivializing
the hard work and ingenuity of the Chinese people, the order has helped reinforce the

Communist Party of China’s (CPC) legitimacy by enabling the country’s economic miracle.³¹ China’s discontent with the current international order is thus partial and selective.³² As one Chinese interviewee puts it: “China is not a supporter of the liberal international order as defined by the US and other Western countries, but it is a major beneficiary and enthusiastic supporter of the economic liberal characteristics of the international order.³³ But, why should the West get to determine the narrative and define who and what is liberal?”³⁴ In essence, China is arguing that every state has the right to set its socio-political identity and values, profile itself the way it wants, and have an independent perspective on the international order, as long as this proceeds peacefully. Indeed, we see a liberation of freedom of identity and opinion proliferating within many liberal democracies regarding, for instance, gender and sexual orientation, but such progressive values that respect states with regards to who they socio-politically are and what they stand for, as well as their views, are not applied to international society by these very countries. China views the rules-based international order to be in a similar vein of selective application.

The Rules-Based International Order

 

The term “rules-based international order” or derivative terms that are occasionally used by US-allies have become established in the geopolitical lexicon of the US. Harvard University’s Stephen M. Walt jokes that “a ready ability to use the phrase ‘rules-based international order’ seems to have become a job requirement for a top position in the U.S. foreign-policy apparatus”.³⁵ Yet, the phrase is not universally accepted. Even at the highest political levels, China is critical of it.³⁶ The rules-based international order is seen as ambiguous. One observer calls the rules-based international order a “chimera”: “It sounds good, can mean different things, and may be easily weaponized”.³⁷ Indeed, much of this weaponization is increasingly aimed at China and other adversaries. Others say that it adds more confusion than precision.³⁸ The term is also oxymoronic, as an international order without a basis in formal rules is not an international order as we have come to understand it. A February 2023 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs white paper titled “US Hegemony and its Perils” provides clear insight into the official Chinese perspective on the term. According to this report, the US “has taken a selective approach to international law and rules, utilizing or discarding them as it sees fit, and has sought to impose rules that serve its own interests in the name of upholding a ‘rules-based international order’”.³⁹

 

An interviewee poignantly underlines that we first need to understand what this rules-based international order is: “You cannot just come up with a new term without saying what precisely it is based on. What rules is it based on? And, rules need to serve and apply to all, right?”⁴⁰ Another interviewee adds that the West monopolizes the narrative of the international order while criticizing China for not following the rules. “The West should not monopolize rules or the rule-making process nor label the world as liberal or non-liberal”. Indeed, the US and its relevant allies have never articulated which rules are part of this order and which rules are not.⁴¹ Which rules apply to whom? Perhaps the failure to invoke international law and instead frequently draw on “rules-based international order” is deliberate; yet, the term is not synonymous with international law.⁴² International law scholar John Dugard writes that it is “unfortunate as it has allowed politicians to invoke the RBO [rules-based international order] without providing an explanation of what they mean. The rules-based international order is too broad, open to political manipulation and double standards. It is something other than international law and [actually] threatens it”.⁴³

Why then is the US using and promoting the term? Perhaps it is for the aforementioned reason or to rally liberal and non- or less-liberal partners alike to join in. There is a potentially another motive for the term being used as the liberal international order’s successor. Across most metrics, The US is still the world’s sole superpower, although its role as a leader seems to be gradually diffusing into that of a coordinator of the international order. One of the reasons for this coordinating role could be that the underlying impetus of the liberal order was to defeat the Soviet Union and rollback the appeal and expansion of communism over capitalism. Yet

that ended over three decades ago. That threat is gone, and if any, the perceived threat is now coming from (effective) authoritarianism such as that of China. One political scientist argues that this need for a threat is important. Historically, orders would collapse when the threat grew too large or dissipated. In the case of the liberal order, this is related to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and, consequently, the waning influence of revolutionary communist ideology.⁴⁴ In other words, while China is often considered to be the threat to the rules-based international order by Western analysts and politicians, perhaps, indeed, part of the challenge to the liberal international order is the absence of a clear, binding threat to the proponents of the liberal international order. China is only partially considered to be a threat by liberal international order proponents and members — otherwise why would China be a major trading partner for over 140 countries in the world? That said, some of China’s neighbours, particularly towards its east and southeast, feel seriously threatened by China’s growing power, but also by its disputed and sizeable territorial claims in the South China Sea and its reinterpretations of the freedom of navigation as stipulated in UNCLOS. Elsewhere, China has also taken an ambiguous position on the notion of territorial integrity and sovereignty regarding to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

 

Irrespective of the previously mentioned need-for-a-threat thesis, Fudan University’s Wu Xinbo declares that the liberal international order is to some degree inherently contradictory and thus carries its own seed of destruction: the hegemonic position that the US enjoys, the hierarchical structure, and the need for US security protection of allies all run against liberal concepts of consent, equality, and multilateralism.⁴⁵ Chicago University’s John Mearsheimer also highlights the liberal international order’s inherent shortcomings; it was always “bound to fail”. He identifies two underlying causes: first, liberal international orders can only arise and be sustained in unipolar systems where the hegemon is a liberal democracy. He states that nationalism — which he considers the most powerful political ideology in the world — and politics that balance power block the expansion of liberal democracy. Second, the US has no choice but to become realistic now that we are back in a multipolar world.⁴⁶ To put it differently, the US is becoming less liberal. Chinese observers, too, highlight that the most liberal component of the international order, the economic order, is becoming less rules-based, and less liberal for that matter, because the more prominent economies of the collective West have turned to protectionism, export controls, friend- and near-shoring.⁴⁷ Importantly, liberalism is individualistic at its core, whereas most of the world has family as its most important institution.⁴⁸ This most certainly also applies to China and virtually the entirety of the Global South. Was the liberal international order ever truly sustainable?

2.2 The Three Prevailing Discontents

As should be evident, there can hardly be a single monolithic view in China on a topic as large and complex as the international order. Even within the CPC and the Chinese intelligentsia,

views on what it is and how to best reform it differ.⁴⁹ However, there is consensus on three prevailing discontents regarding the current international order:

1. The international order should not be labelled nor indoctrinated as a liberal international order as there is no universality of (socio-)political models and values; instead, there is great socio-political plurality and diversity,

2. The US-led West should not have a hegemony in the international order, and

3. The binary and exclusive US-led security alliances and institutions should not be considered part of the international order as these go against the UN concept of cooperative security.

Let us examine these three discontents more closely.

 

1. Liberal Doctrine and Labelling

 

According to China, the international order should not be labelled or considered liberal for two reasons: firstly, a minority of the member states of the international order are liberal democracies, and secondly, the liberal international order is not genuinely liberal.⁵⁰ For starters, let us begin with the international order at the member-state level. China posits that no universality exists for any socio-political model and that liberal democracy is no exception. China claims that the world is too large and diverse to permit a uniformly applicable political system such as liberal democracy and corresponding values.⁵¹ Chinese observers argue that distinct historical and cultural trajectories have led to dissimilar political values, customs, and systems, and these need to be acknowledged and respected.⁵² Sometimes these trajectories become infused with religion as is the case with political Islam today, and previously this was seen in much of the West with the union of the state and the church. China does not denounce this fusion, democracy, or any other system, but rather articulates that political plurality and diversity is a global reality: “Different histories, national conditions, ethnic groups, and customs have given birth to diverse civilizations. Diversity of human civilizations is a basic

feature of our world. Such cultural diversity is what makes the world colourful”.⁵³ China’s perspective is also close(r) to (the) UN Charter (Article 2, Principles 1 and 4), which maintains that all states are sovereign: judging or attempting to alter political systems in other states goes against this sovereignty. In effect, China has a realistic view on socio-political pluralism, whereas many in the West promote liberal democracy as the political ideal and the “end station” for socio-political evolution. However, despite some of its merits, liberalism has, as discussed throughout this report, not only theoretical, but also historical contradictions: colonialism and imperialism were clear evidence of the latter.

Democracy certainly seems to be the most sensible and ideal system for political organization. Yet, looking closer at some of the contemporary political models among major civilizations, the Chinese perspective is more accurate. With regards to different forms of governance, Russia is predominantly considered autocratic, India is a flawed democracy, and the Islamic world is mostly authoritarian or hybrid.⁵⁴ Only 24 countries out of the 193 — that is, 14.4 percent of countries and 8 percent of the world population — were considered to be full democracies in 2022.⁵⁵ The index ranks all other countries, namely 85.6 percent of the countries across the globe, as being either flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, or authoritarian regimes. A growing amount of Chinese white papers and journal articles reflect Chinese acknowledgment of the world’s civilizational and political plurality and diversity.⁵⁶ Different civilizations have different views on order and rules are based on civilizational values, too. Rules are not entirely neutral.⁵⁷ The 2019 “China’s National Defence in the New Era” document underlines “respect for diverse civilizations”⁵⁸ as a critique of the West’s more selective view.

 

Two years later, in 2021, in an elaborative white paper titled “China: Democracy That Works”, the Chinese authorities delve into the concept of order, history, and application of democracy, arguing that no single country, group of countries, or civilization has the right to monopolize the concept and application of democracy. The paper contends, as the next paraphrase exhibits, that there is no single model of democracy: “There is no fixed model of democracy; it manifests itself in many forms. Political systems vary from civilization to civilization, and each has its own strengths. Assessing the myriad political systems in the world against a single yardstick and examining diverse political structures in monochrome are in themselves undemocratic”.⁵⁹

 

Addressing Chinese discontent of the international order at the international or system level, Chinese scholar Tang Shiping provides insight on this through a number of publications. He argues that the notion of liberal international order has been a product of self-congratulation and justification after the end of the Cold War as well as a product of intellectual inertia that lacks critical reflection. He states that the current order is liberal only in the economic sense: a political order can be called liberal only when all partaking subjects, such as every one of the 193 nation-states recognized by the UN, willingly submit to it.⁶⁰ Moreover, and as discussed previously, the order cannot be considered liberal because the majority of the world is, at the national level, not a liberal democracy.⁶¹ A case can also be made that a liberal international order, if truly liberal in nature, would also liberally acknowledge and accept different socio-political systems and values, including China’s, and permit them to take part in shaping rules within the international order so long as it relies on peaceful means.⁶² If not, then it cannot be considered liberal or progressive in its views of other socio-political systems. This leads one to the question: what makes the liberal international order liberal? Is it liberal in the sense that it is progressive and pluralistic, liberal in its principles and values, or liberal in that it is inclusive? One Chinese expert, with a combination of slight hesitation and conviction, answers that the Western approach is “racist”.⁶³

 

China also adheres to plurality and diversity regarding human rights as China sees it being based on national conditions, cultural traditions, and where one sits on the development trajectory.⁶⁴ “To impose one’s own view of democracy, freedom, and human rights on others is a violation of the true spirit of democracy, freedom, and human rights”.⁶⁵ China believes that human rights, which is a continuous process, are not universal and should not have a narrow focus on individual liberties as per the West’s definitions, but widen the scope to include the right to and an emphasis on development rights, for example. This interpretation is one way that China is shaping global norms and rules, interpreting principles of Western Enlightenment through a Confucian lens of governance that stresses an essential unity between citizens and state, rather than giving primacy to human rights as assertions against the state.⁶⁶ Let us follow with the second discontent.

2. Unfair US-led Western Hegemony

 

Chinese scholar Wu Xinbo argues that international order has been characterized by hegemony, alliance, and hierarchy since the end of World War Two.⁶⁷ While this is not entirely inaccurate, we need to keep in mind that the US invited the Republic of China to be one of the four global “policemen” alongside the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and itself. Nonetheless, after the Communist takeover in 1949, the PRC joined the Soviet camp and opposed the US-led Western order. So, the US did not go against its Wilsonian vision nor initially unilaterally want to “police” the world or serve as a hegemon after World War Two. It was the PRC and the Soviet Union that resisted becoming part of a Western-led order. In fact, China swung from the West to the Soviet Union, and back to the West. One could conclude that China was ideologically “unconfident” and strategically incoherent. Over the span of a few decades, China went from being pro-Western and liberal to anti-Western and revolutionary to pro-globalization and driven by growth. Moreover, if the US wanted to exclude China from the international order, it could have done so after the Cold War. Instead, the US continued to integrate China. One could of course argue that this was not out of sheer altruism: among factors that include improving the balance of power with regards to the Soviet Union, (the) US business (elites) profited considerably from this integration.

 

Nevertheless, China vehemently criticizes what it considers the US-hegemonic position. The previously cited Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs white paper titled “US Hegemony and its Perils” argues that “the United States has long been attempting to mould other countries and the world order with its own values and political system in the name of promoting democracy and human rights”.⁶⁸ In a very direct fashion, the paper accuses the US of political, military, economic, technological, and cultural hegemony. It claims that the US applies double standards and puts domestic law above international law. It cites the US’ 2017 withdrawal from UNESCO and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, as well as their withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council a year later and the Treaty on Open Skies in 2020. Economically and technologically speaking, China condemns the hegemony of the US dollar and the liberal application of sanctions and “long-arm jurisdiction, affecting international stability”. Finally, the paper accuses the US of using cultural tools to sustain hegemony.

 

Criticizing US-led Western hegemony at a UNSC high-level meeting in 2021, Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated: “International rules must be based on international law, and must be written by all. They are not a [hegemonic] patent or a privilege of a few. They must be applicable to all countries, and there should be no room for exceptionalism or double standards”.⁶⁹ In a similar vein, one Chinese interviewee argues: “The current order carries the hegemonic mentality of the US. It lacks fairness and claims to be open and prosperous, but it is mostly catered for the West. The voice and rights of the rest are not equal. [The development of] many countries [are] kept down to serve Western economies. This is exemplary of Western double standards”.⁷⁰ This is echoed by two other Chinese scholars: “The order has clear geographic boundaries and is an instrument for” the US as a gatekeeper.⁷¹

 

They interestingly maintain that US hegemony is the end goal, that US strength serves as the foundation, and that the institutions act as the means of the liberal international order. Echoing this, Fu Ying, Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress, suggests that the US receives disproportionate benefits from the existing institutions.⁷² She is referring in particular to the IMF and World Bank, where the US has de facto veto rights over key decisions — the only member to have this. One could also argue that the liberal international order is a combination of hegemony and multilateralism, with the latter only extending to certain rungs. This dynamic hinders the efficacy of key international institutions in addressing old and new global challenges. Now it is time to turn to the third discontent.

3. US-led Security Alliances and Institutions

 

The third discontent holds that US-led global military alliances and institutions need to be distinguished from the international order. China perceives these as bi- and multilateral US security policies. US security alliances and military hegemony are detrimental to balance and stability and are one of the root causes of international conflict.⁷³ Here, China is referring to NATO and the so-called US-led hub-and-spokes alliance in the Indo-Pacific,  the two principal manifestations of US global military might. China sees these US-led military blocs and its roughly 800 military bases and installations across the world as going against the multilateral spirit and letter of the UN for political and security matters, and also against the UN Charter’s notion of cooperative and collective security (collective in this context meaning “by all” rather than by a select collective group). It argues that these are not part of the UN system or the international order. Rather, it sees them as vehicles to sustain US hegemony. These structures emerged after the end of World War Two, and the raison d’être was primarily to contain the Soviet Union and thwart its territorial expansion. China, in some respects, has become the “new” Soviet Union. Fu Ying said in a speech that China is politically treated as an alien and militarily as a security threat.⁷⁴ The Indo-Pacific concept attests to that. Within the context of the Indo-Pacific concept, the same goes for the corresponding strengthening and proliferation of bilateral and minilateral security ties between the US and partners such as AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, and the US) and the QUAD (US, Japan, India, and Australia)⁷⁵ that encircle and aim to contain China.⁷⁶

 

Consequently, the authorities accuse the US of undermining the international order in a 2019 white Paper by the State Council: “The Cold War mentality of encirclement, constraint, confrontation, and threat is resurfacing. Hegemonism and power politics are surging. The law of the jungle and zero-sum games have found new soil in which to breed. These challenges are grievously undermining the post-World War II international order”.⁷⁷ The US has pursued direct or indirect “wanton use of force” in 190-odd countries thus far.⁷⁸ China is also clearly discontent with the US-led West’s military (and non-military) interventions in other countries’ sovereignty in the name of democratization and associated rationales — also known as the responsibility to protect (R2P). The UN Charter, whose centrality the Chinese authorities tend to refer to, falls somewhat short as it leaves room for interpretation. Only in Article 11.1 can a reference be found to cooperative security for and by the General Assembly. While the document repeatedly refers to fostering international peace and security, it provides provisions for regional structures and centralizes the role of the UNSC. However, as is widely known, the UNSC is largely defunct and exclusive. Its three largest permanent members — the US (and its allies United Kingdom and France) on the one side, and Russia and China on the other — rarely cooperate on international security matters. It should be noted that China has been comparatively reluctant to use its veto power: it has not cast a single veto since 1999.

 

2.3 Conclusions

China’s perspectives on the international order revolve around three discontents: the West’s liberal labelling and indoctrination, the unfair hegemony of the West that is spearheaded by the US, and US-led security alliances and institutions. These are some of the manifestations of the international order, rather than its fundamentals. China argues that the West does not acknowledge and respect civilizational plurality and, therefore, socio-political diversity. Nor should the West be allowed to have a patent on the definition of democracy and liberalism. China also contends that the international order is not liberal at all, as it is dismissive of other political models and values, and that its US-led collective security approaches go against the spirit and letter of cooperative security dictated by the UN Charter. Only the economic order can be considered liberal in the Chinese view, but an increasingly protective and securitizing West is making that less liberal, too. In a sense, China is attempting to “liberate” and “democratize” the international order, as we will see in Section 3. Regarding the term “rules-based international order”, China holds that the US has taken a selective approach to international law and rules, seeking to impose chimeric rules that serve its own interests. International rules, China argues, must be based on international law, and are not a patent or a privilege of a few.

3. China's Preferences for the Interntional Order

Key Findings

• China does not prefer to overturn the current international order or build a parallel one and it isn’t able to do so. China seems to know its limits: it neither has the capacity nor the legitimacy. It supports an international order based on the UN system and Charter and underpinned by international law.

• China is a conservationist and reformist. It reiterates and expands on positive UN Charter ideals, principles, values, and norms centred on equality, diversity, cooperation, development, and cooperative security through three new initiatives backed by the vision of a “shared future of mankind”.

• China believes no single civilization should dominate the international order; rather, it claims that the input of multiple civilizations and cultures will strengthen its fundamentals and legitimacy.

• China argues that the international community needs to revisit the drawing table with regards to international order: the current order needs egalitarian input and updating to deal with new complex challenges.

• China’s three primary reform propositions are: 1. make the international order politically value-neutral; 2. make it economically egalitarian by reforming the IMF, World Bank, and WTO; and 3. promote cooperative rather than collective security.

 

Continuing from Section 2’s three discontents regarding the order’s perceived illegitimacy and unfairness, this section first discusses China’s broader preferences for the international order and then resumes with specific proposals for reform.

 

3.1 Preferences

 

“The dream of the Chinese people is closely connected with the dreams of the peoples of other countries; the Chinese Dream can be realized only in a peaceful international environment and under a stable international order”.  Speech by President Xi Jinping, delivered at the Nineteenth National Congress of the CPC on 18 October 2017.⁷⁹

 

Let it be clear from the outset, and as the above excerpt shows, that China’s previously discussed perspectives and preferences for the international order discussed in this section are not independent of national interests, CPC interests, and geopolitical considerations. With the exception of the CPC factor, this correlation evidently applies to all countries. That said, and with this as a backdrop, China’s preferences for the international order — at least, rhetorically — are the most inclusive, constructive, and progressive by any major power. Rather than focusing on rules, it intends to instead infuse the international order with positive and constructive ideals, values, principles, and norms. China sees the world as single interdependent system of different civilizations, cultures, and societies with their respective histories, traditions, and values. Whereas Western civilization — which is noble in the sense that it has, inter alia, advanced modernity, human rights, the rule of law, and freedom of speech to new heights — tends to see itself as the pinnacle of human civilization and organization, the Middle Kingdom, which once saw itself as a civilizational pinnacle for a long time, appears to have taken a dramatic change of stance and become more humble, acknowledging that no civilization is superior and that we can all learn from one another.

 

China’s 2023 whitepaper “A Global Community of Shared Future: China’s Proposals and Actions” refers to “civilization” no less than 53 times. It takes collective human civilization progress, rather than that of a single civilization, as the point of departure and end goal. Under these auspices, it acknowledges the plurality in human civilizations and argues that: “We should increase inter-civilization exchanges to promote harmony, inclusiveness, and respect for differences. The goal is not to replace one system or civilization with another. We should respect all civilizations, treat each other as equals, and draw inspiration from each other to boost the creative development of human civilization”.⁸⁰ As a result, China advanced a Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) in 2023.⁸¹ In this regard, China is unique as it promotes unity in diversity. In the Asia-Pacific context, the State Council wrote in 2017: “Asia-Pacific countries have unique diversities” and “differ in their historical traditions, political systems, levels of development, and security concerns. […] Countries may become partners when they have the same values and ideals, but they can also be partners if they seek common ground while reserving differences. The key is to remain committed to treating each other as equals and carrying out mutually beneficial cooperation”.⁸² China stresses development and cooperation because the Chinese authorities believe that the balance of international forces is developing in a way that favours world peace⁸³ and common development is key to that.

 

While Indian authorities also stress the unity of the world by means of the recent vision that “the world is one family” (“Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam”, originating from ancient Hindu texts), China has indeed put forward various white papers and concepts that propel these principles. The GCI, the 2021 Global Development Initiative (GDI),⁸⁴ and the 2022–23 Global Security Initiative (GSI), which promotes indivisible security,⁸⁵ are three such examples. These initiatives and principles may find their roots in Buddhist and Daoist traditions, the latter of

which emphasizes the unity of opposites. These two are cyclical rather than linear spiritual traditions such as the mainstream Western monotheistic religions, such as Christianity, which tend to adhere to a binary concept of good versus evil. In the context of this report, the Chinese philosophical view implies that different civilizations, principles, values, and corresponding socio-political systems are not diametrically opposed as standalone entities, but rather complement one another. Or, if one is sceptical, these Chinese initiatives and principles are geopolitical plots to offer an alternative to the US approach to international order and to garner the support of the Global South until China is a superpower. Irrespective of where one stands, China has continuously articulated new visions for the world on how to develop, cooperate, organize, and learn from one another since the former President Hu Jintao administration’s 2005 “Harmonious World” and it can even be found now during the President Xi Jinping administration. China has proposed a “community of shared future” to guide humanity and to focus on dialogue and partnership rather than confrontation. Of course, China’s own adherence to these principles is questioned by some.⁸⁶ Are China’s visions too idealistic for this highly competitive world?⁸⁷ Perhaps some of them are. But these visions may eventually enjoy support in the Global South. Former Indian diplomat and intellectual Shivshankar Menon points out that few countries are entirely happy about the current international order, and that all major powers are revisionists. Borrowing from a Beatles’ song title, he sees revisionists “here, there, and everywhere”.⁸⁸

 

China has recognized and accepted the reality that the world is increasingly becoming multipolar, and that true multilateralism rather than US-led Western hierarchy is the only practical and moral way forward. China holds that today’s hierarchy mostly reflects the balance of power from 1945, not that of 2024. In other words, the system rarely changed although the balance of power has shifted. Moreover, from a demographic perspective, the Western population makes up less than 15 percent of the world’s total. It is indeed unbalanced to have less than 15 percent hold a disproportionate position in the international order. Fudan University’s Ren Xiao and Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences’ Liu Ming point out that the President Xi administration wants to change a long-held paradigm under which one universal value system and powerful civilization, referring to the West, has dominated international society. ⁸⁹

 

In sum, and following Section 2 and Section 3’s findings, what is China’s preferred international order based on? It is based on:

• The Centrality of the UN system and Charter for all political and security matters,

• International law as embodied by respective multilateral agreements and treaties and customary law as underpinnings,

• Solving security problems and challenges cooperatively through diplomacy and multilateralism,

• An open economic order, and

• Egalitarianism infused by principles of all members.

 

Ren and Liu claim that this preferred international order does not deviate much from the fundamentals of the international order, but rather provides a moderate blueprint for its betterment.⁹⁰ This blueprint is not elaborated upon in detail, but the claim and direction for the betterment certainly are. This betterment should be devised and conducted collectively, and the wisdom and values of different civilizations should be leveraged. Remarkably, a 2023 International Affairs article — drawing on articles from East and Southeast Asia about Asian conceptions of international order that indicates that China’s position on the international order — is not that different from (some of) these Asian states.⁹¹

 

Tempering worries in the West of a world led by the Chinese instead of the West, one interviewee states: “The world and the West do not need to fear that Chinese civilization will become universal and come to dominate the international order. Chinese civilization can never become universal. It is too distinct”. Indeed, besides the “distinctness” of Chinese civilization, China has not yet acquired the legitimacy to run or lead the international order. China still has a limited track record of running regional and especially global institutions, whether these be in the realm of politics, economics, or security. China will thus have to earn the trust and endorsement of the international community first. Furthermore, liberal international order expert Ikenberry posits that the liberal democratic component, of which the West is like a patron or curator, sits on top of other layers that make up the international order; it is not the core or foundation.⁹² In other words, China is not threatening the foundations of the international order. Similarly, an extensive RAND study concludes that although Chinese-led initiatives do in fact challenge US leadership and influence, they generally do not pose a threat to the fundamental integrity of the international system.⁹³

 

With these preferences and realities in mind, let us examine China’s specific proposals for reform more closely.

 

3.2 Reform

 

In accordance with the three prevailing discontents elaborated upon in Section 2, China’s proposals for international reform can be considered as direct responses to these three discontents across the political, economic, and security domains of the international order. China does not appear to be interested in overturning the current international order or building a parallel one and it is not capable of doing such.⁹⁴ China is in fact a staunch upholder of many facets of the international order and has a vested interest in its continuation. Indeed, compared to imperial and colonial orders of the past, the existing order is, all in all, easy to join and hard to overturn. It also allows states to share in its economic spoils and to actively participate.⁹⁵ As previously discussed, China agrees that the order that arose after World War Two has its rationale and does not want to overturn it. As one interviewee suggests: “It is not perfect but cannot be discarded. We need to go back to the international order drawing table. There are only grey shades of interpretation and difference, these need to be worked out”.⁹⁶

 

The Chinese government is very serious about reforming the international order and making it better. In 2022, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Le Yucheng spoke in the strongest terms: “China has made vigorous efforts to advance reform of the global governance system, reject fake multilateralism, fake rules, fake human rights, and fake democracy, and defend the stability of the international order and international fairness and justice”.⁹⁷ The timing of China’s calls for reform is no coincidence. It coincides with contemporary Chinese intellectual “maturity” on the subject, China’s return as a great power, and the relative decline of the US as a global power. Apart from China, many others in and beyond the Indo-Pacific have found more confidence and a stronger sense of self-determination. Indeed, there seems to be a rather widespread belief within the CPC that the era of US hegemony and a US-led international order is gradually coming to an end and that the international order will be less West-centric.⁹⁸ While some in China may have grown too confident and too optimistic about the decline of the US, views on a “new era of unprecedented change” are regularly shared by President Xi.⁹⁹

 

In the Chinese vision, the international order will still be liberal.¹⁰⁰ This will be a different interpretation and application of liberalism, though: it will be more about how liberally the international order is run, rather than its political ideology. China proposes to democratize and liberate the order that is dominated by the West and led by the US, retain open markets, multilateralism, economic interdependence, international rule of law, and cooperative security, but omit doctrinal socio-political liberal values such as liberal democracy, individual-oriented societies, full freedom of expression, thought, and religion, and collective security.

 

The first proposal for reform is a universal acknowledgment of political plurality and diversity. Clearly, a perceptual gap exists between China and the West with respect to their comprehension of the international order after 1945: China has a pragmatic and functional view, whereas the West has an ideological emphasis.¹⁰¹ China suggests discontinuing the liberal labelling and doctrine. While it is true that the UN Charter already stipulates this, the Chinese proposal reiterates it and, within those confines, articulates principles that permit each member to apply a socio-political model and identify themselves as they deem fit as long as it is based on peaceful and cooperative means within the international order. Unlike others, China holds that the UN Charter is not outdated: “The various confrontations and injustices in the world today did not occur because the purposes and principles of the UN Charter are outdated, but because they are not effectively maintained and implemented”.¹⁰² Essentially, this argues that the liberal international order has drifted too far away from the Charter. Therefore, a 2020 study concludes that China has been passive toward the restructuring of legal norms, merely invoking them when a specific dispute arises.¹⁰³

 

This corresponds with China’s vision of a “shared future of mankind”, which is based on shared humanity and shared progress — or shared regress.¹⁰⁴ China’s preferences for international order fall under these auspices and the 1954 “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”.¹⁰⁵ These Five Principles were a response (by China, India, and Myanmar at the time) to developing countries’ appeal against imperialism, colonialism, and hegemonism. They reflected the aspirations of those countries for independence, autonomy, self-improvement, and the choice of how to develop.¹⁰⁶ These principles, which the Chinese authorities still refer to frequently, are strongly in line with the Westphalian and UN Charter principles discussed in Section 1 and strongly oppose liberal doctrines, R2P interventions, and indoctrination of the international order as liberal. Through the overarching “shared future of mankind” vision and the triad of the GCI, GDI, and GSI, China is promoting new values, principles, and norms that aim to depoliticize the international order. Because China does not expect the West to accept these overnight, if at all, it tends to focus on the Global South.

 

The second proposal for reform is two-fold. Firstly, China is suggesting that institutions become multilateral in a more equitable manner and that there should be fair rules and decision-making processes, so that, according to China, the US-led West-dominated economic order is no longer at the expense of the rest. Secondly, they want to “update” the institutions and make them more effective in dealing with complex and urgent global challenges.¹⁰⁷ China’s main position is that existing institutions are good but need to adapt and reform to make them more efficient and fairer for emerging economies and developing countries. Seconding this need, UN Secretary General António Guterres said in a 2022 General Assembly speech: “Let’s tell it like it is: the global financial system is morally bankrupt. It favours the rich and punishes the poor”.¹⁰⁸ China has proposals for reform concerning the key economic institutions, the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. China highlights that the leadership of the IMF and World Bank institution is always Western at the director and deputy director level, and if it isn’t, then it’s that of a Western ally.¹⁰⁹ As a matter of fact, this also applies to the UN. In its entire history, the IMF managing director has always been European, the First Deputy Managing Director always American, and the chief economist always Western or an ally of the West with but one single exception. Furthermore, due to its significant voting rights, the US has a veto in both the IMF and World Bank, the only country that has such. China pleads that the governing structures of these institutions need to be reformed by giving emerging economies a larger role because the current modality disproportionally benefits the largest economies. The problem is that changes in, for example, the IMF require approval by a super-majority of 85 percent of voting power, but with the US holding 16.5 percent of the votes, it can effectively veto any change. Hence, China argues that the developed economies, mostly Western and Western allies, have control over underdeveloped economies by dominating rule-making processes. For instance, the Euro area, with a population of 342 million people, controls roughly 20 percent of the voting power at the World Bank, while Africa’s 54 countries, an aggregate of 1.4 billion people, collectively have a voting share of roughly 7 percent.¹¹⁰ Regarding the effectiveness of international institutions, Fu Ying highlights the shortcomings of the UN in identifying the looming danger of the 2008 financial crisis and the fact that it did not play a significant role in countering the crisis. Similarly, the UN has (had) difficulty guiding effective responses to climate change.¹¹¹

Some might be astonished to learn that China that is attempting to “save” the liberal economic order and the legitimacy of its key institutions. The liberal economic order is in danger of crumbling from within as some of the major players in the collective West pursue security over efficiency, resulting in greater protectionism, export controls, and friend- and near-shoring.¹¹² Indeed, if the liberal international order is not liberal towards different ideas, different political systems, and cooperative security, and if it is increasingly less economically liberal in practice by its principle architects, while increasingly fewer states are considered liberal democracies, then what semblance of liberalism remains in the liberal international order?

 

The third proposal for reform is to change prevailing views on international security and grant the UN a larger role in global security governance, specifically the General Assembly, relevant UN Committees, and the Security Council. In its GSI, China argues that values, principles, and norms need to become more positive-sum, cooperative, and inclusive. Or, in the words of President Xi, there needs to be “common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security”. The GSI posits that humanity is a security community that is indivisible and that the security of one country should not come at the expense of others.¹¹³ This resembles Chinese traditional medicine approaches which see the human body as an interdependent whole, as opposed to the more organ-specific approaches in Western medicine. China sees NATO and the hub-and-spokes alliance system as being precisely that. China also recommends more holistic thinking on how traditional and non-traditional security threats are intertwined and resolving security matters through political dialogue and peaceful negotiation.¹¹⁴ It accuses the US and its allies of having a Cold War bloc mentality and corresponding approach and design of security arrangements. China can point at its own track record in the last forty years. It has not fought war since 1979 and has not used lethal military force abroad since 1988. Nor has it funded or supported proxies or armed insurgents anywhere in the world since the early 1980s. This is a unique record of non-intervention among the world’s great powers.¹¹⁵

3.3 Conclusions

China does not prefer to overturn the current international order or build a parallel one and it isn’t able to do so. China seems to know its limits: it neither has the capacity nor the legitimacy. It wants an international order based on the UN system and Charter and underpinned by international law. It is, therefore, conservationist. At the same time, it wants reform, not by changing institutions or rules per se but by reiterating and, in some cases, expanding on the Charter’s ideals, values, principles, and norms revolving around equality, diversity, cooperation, development, and cooperative security. Equality in this context translates into making important rule-making processes more egalitarian. China is putting forward new initiatives and principles, including the GCI, GDI, and GSI, that are likely to gain traction outside the West. China argues that it isn’t only the major powers but the entire international community that needs to revisit the drawing table with regards to international order, since the current order is in need of egalitarian input and updating so that there is universal security and common prosperity. This updating, or reform, is in direct response to China’s prevailing three discontents identified in Section 2. As a response, China’s three primary suggestions for reform are: 1. make the international order politically value-neutral so that it no longer has a binary, divisive, and derogatory nature; 2. make it economically egalitarian by reforming the rule-making framework in the IMF, World Bank, and WTO; and 3. promote collective security that is cooperative rather than binary.

4. How should the EU proceed?

Key Recommendations
• China’s perspective, preferences, and calls for reform are not unreasonable and reflect the world’s political, economic, civilizational, and cultural polarity and diversity. The EU should consider acting in a more reserved manner with regards to the liberal indoctrination of the international order.
• China as well as most others favour an international order based on rules and mostly abide by them. Thus, rather than strictly focusing on rules, the EU should give way to more egalitarian principles and be more receptive to other civilization’s perspectives on the international order.
• The EU should support the reform of a fraying international order and welcome internationalist reforms in key institutions while a legitimate and functioning international order imposes constraints on the power dynamics between China and the US and their conflict — which is one of the biggest risks to global stability in this century.
• The EU should develop a vision for a reformed international order, seeking common ground and constructive ways to move forward, particularly regarding cooperative security.

 

With China’s perspectives and preferences for the international order and reform outlined as such, the question is: how should the EU consider approaching the international order?

 

As concluded in Section 1, international order is a recent phenomenon in human history. It therefore finds itself in early internationalist stages and is a continuous work in progress. Because international relations are not static, the international order cannot be static either. The world’s civilizations and societies are finally interacting on a standing that is somewhat more equal. Led by China, the international order’s values, principles, rules, and norms are increasingly scrutinized through non-Western civilizational, (geo)political, and intellectual viewpoints. Indeed, the world has become less acquiescing, and reformists are aplenty. The EU needs to acknowledge this and start acting accordingly. Some, such as German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, are already aware of this to some degree: “Those who are nostalgic for the dream of a European world power […] are stuck in the past”.¹¹⁶

 

But in contrast to the way mainstream media increasingly portrays it in the West, this is not necessarily bad news, “the end of the world”, or the beginning of an authoritarian world.¹¹⁷There is no need to view the international order through such simplistic binary lenses. Rather, this invitation to change is a very useful and timely wake-up call and a unique opportunity to access and gain wisdom, knowledge, values, and perspectives from the four corners of the world. To truly learn from one another and to fuse humanity’s knowledge and wisdom could lead to enlightenment at a global level. For one, these reformists that are often constructive — with China being the most active, competent, and resourceful — are not launching a frontal attack on the international order and they are not making demands for an alternative order. They recognize the many merits of the one ruling today. Rather, they are seeking recognition from Europe (and the US) with regards to their culture and socio-political systems, as well as a new balance of inclusivity and input in high-level decision-making processes. Some, like China, also seek more cooperative interpretations of security rather than collective ones. Indeed, the current global security frameworks and principles frequently demonstrate their inadequacy, as can be seen in the escalating tensions and armed conflicts. We need to come together, engage in conversations, and reassess the concept and implementation of security, its order, and framework. Moreover, it is undeniable that the collective wisdom, knowledge, values, and reflections of all member states combined outweigh that of a single cohort, such as the West. It is impossible for the EU to deny this.

 

China’s calls for reform and its proposed initiatives are not irrational and reflect the world’s civilizational, cultural, socio-political, and economic polarity and diversity. How can the EU, a beacon of liberalism and progressivism, not arrive at the same observation or have done so already? Importantly, China’s vision for the international order is no less rules-based than that of the US, something which Harvard’s top international relations intellectual Stephen Walt concludes.¹¹⁸ While China predominantly tends to be reformist in its approach to the US-dominated regional maritime security order, this is less pronounced at the international level. To illustrate Walt’s point, we could look at China’s support of UNSC resolutions. Between 2000 and 2018, China backed 182 out of 190 UNSC resolutions that imposed sanctions on nations deemed to be in violation of international rules or norms.¹¹⁹ Fareed Zakaria, a globally respected voice of reason, astutely observes that: “The old order — in which small European countries act as global heavyweights while behemoths such as China and India are excluded from the first ranks of global institutions — cannot be sustained”.¹²⁰ Indeed, multipolarity requires reform of the international order. Otherwise, it risks losing relevance and influence, and that would pose a real risk to the international order.

 

With these global shifts and arguments in mind, it is evident that it is preferrable to address such plurality and suggestions for reform through peacefully negotiated institutional, principal, and normative change than through conflict.¹²¹ Moreover, the longer the EU waits, the more it risks being seen as resistant to change by parties that do not belong to the West. The non-West is not complaining because they like to, but because they have genuine and long-standing concerns. Manifestations of the liberal international order are under genuine duress of legitimacy. This is both due to failure to effectively deal with longstanding challenges, such as persistent poverty in the Global South, and emerging ones, such as climate change, as well as its unrealistically conceived liberal indoctrination and certain inherent theoretical and historical shortcomings.

 

How should the EU in particular proceed? Within the EU, it is necessary reach a consensus on what the international order is, what it is made of, and what it should be. To give just one example: in the collective West, references to the international order range from the “international order” to the “liberal international order” and many shades in between. More recently, one sees variants of the “rules-based international order”, which originates in the 1990s but is especially popular in the US today. China, too, has a host of references for the international order. It refers to international order as the “post-war international order”, the “international order”, “world order”, “existing international order”, “the international order underpinned by international law”, or “the international system”. It will be hard to come to terms if there is no agreement on such conceptual and terminological fundamentals.  Many EU member states, particularly the larger players such as Germany and France that tend to adopt a broader perspective, can start this process domestically before taking it to the EU level. Building on consensus within the EU, it will eventually need to develop its collective vision for the international order and necessary improvements — rather than merely reiterating and centralizing a rules-based order. Most states usually abide by existing rules. The issue is rather that some new rules need to be crafted, other rules leave room for interpretation, and still other existing rules do not serve all parties and their corresponding decision-making and rule-making processes are not egalitarian. There is enough classical and contemporary wisdom and sophistication in European civilization to promote such egalitarianism. Arguably, no continent in the world enjoys the socio-economic egalitarianism that Europe has in the past. If the EU can develop this at home, it should not have difficulty promoting and co-developing this at the level of international order.

 

The European vision will need proposals to advance the international order’s legitimacy, sustain what works, and provide suggestions for reform for what does not. It must be clear by now that the Westphalian principles of sovereignty, equal standing, and non-interference that are enshrined in the UN Charter are considered untouchable by virtually all countries in the Global South. The EU should respect that. They do not want to make the EU and its member states in their image, and the EU should not try to make them in its image. Keeping in mind that the current liberal international order was created in a balance of power that was favourable to Europe after World War Two, listening with an open mind to different civilizations and cultures, actors large and small, particularly in the Global South, is absolutely imperative in a multipolar world. Equally imperative is that the EU and its member states follow up with concrete actions with regards to reforming the international order and making compromises. Just listening will not do. We have moved past that chapter in the book of international order.

 

As international order, which is still in its early stages, continues to evolve, it will likely become a fusion of values and principles from several civilizations: Western, Chinese, Hindu, African, Islamic, Latin, and Orthodox, among others, and those of other and subcultures. This will enrich the international order and recuperate its validity. Given its role as the original curator and, in absolute terms, still a highly influential actor, Western civilization will continue to exert significant influence on the international order. But this requires Europe to become involved more enthusiastically. On a final note, it is absolutely critical that this progression of the international order does not become a clash of civilizations. It should rather proceed through dialogue, understanding, compromise, cooperation, and fusion. Let us write the next chapter of the book of international order together.