The body of cadres forms the most dynamic and essential driving force and organizer in China’s process of reform and opening-up. Positioned at the core of the nation’s political and socio-economic systems, this group commands the most extensive and influential pool of governing resources, serving as the backbone force propelling the significant developments of the party and the country. This group is predominantly found in party and government organs, state-owned enterprises, and mass organizations. Since the reform and opening-up, this cadre group, with government officials at its core from party and administrative organs, has maintained overall stability in its size, with a slight increase in total quantity. Recruitment channels primarily include examination-based selection, military cadre transitioning, and government appointment systems. The cadre distinctly holds a position at the apex of the societal pyramid, signifying an elevated status in the broader social structure.

 

As an archetype within the governmental structure, the cadre enjoys high social and political standing, marked by stability and comprehensive institutional protection at legal and practical levels. Identity assurance, welfare protection, and systemic safeguards collectively form the factors affecting the cadre’s structure of interests. Identity assurance is notably characterized by the lifelong prestige of cadre status, affording an elevated political and social standing, along with a dignified professional identity. Welfare protection represents the second indicative factor in the formation of group interests in modern society. The cadre group experiences a higher sense of job security and relatively elevated social satisfaction. Systemic safeguards, the third vital characterization of institutional factors, manifests in the cadre group's enjoyment of institutional dividends within the legal system, existing policies, and practical societal interactions. The systemic protection for the political status, social standing, and social security of the cadre is notably high, supported by a comprehensive set of rules and mechanisms that have been formalized and systematized through legal provisions.

 

The cadre serves as the leading force in the party's governance of the nation, distinguished by their ideological consciousness, professional competencies, and ability. In terms of ideological consciousness, they display a high level of political awareness, unwavering loyalty to the party's cause, and a strong endorsement of the socialist system with Chinese characteristics. Furthermore, they express confidence in the ongoing development and refinement of this system, coupled with immense pride and assurance in the nation's future progress. Possessing a heightened sense of dedication, they actively implement the party's strategic course, guiding principles, and policies, while exemplifying strong commitment and a profound sense of achievement. The cadre  also shows a strong identification with their professional roles, viewing socialist undertakings as essential to their livelihood, and establishing themselves as a dependable governing group.

 

In their professional aspect, the cadre faces heavy workloads and significant pressure, particularly at the grassroots level where they often work at or beyond full capacity. Their pressures primarily revolve around societal development, accountability, public well-being, and the quality of people's daily lives. In terms of income, their comprehensive earnings remain stable and are trending towards standardization. Since the initiation of reform and opening-up, the overall average income of the cadre group has experienced significant growth, closely mirroring the growth in the national average wage levels.

 

However, it is worth noting that the cadre group is not without its own demands and challenges. Concerning work, there is a genuine call to alleviate the burden at the grassroots, especially among grassroots cadres who harbor strong dissatisfaction and aversion to formalism and bureaucracy. Concerning income, the disparity between family earnings and expenses, coupled with the desire to uphold a dignified lifestyle, acts as crucial criteria for assessing cadre income levels. Particularly among middle-aged cadres, the impact of real-life pressures is not to be overlooked, with widespread occurences of housing- or mortgage-related stress.

 

In terms of motivation, some cadre members encounter issues of insufficient initiative or inaction, resulting in the erosion of the overall work enthusiasm and motivation, leading to the development of a sense of professional burnout. In terms of accountability, negative observable patterns, including a fear of making mistakes, a lack of responsibility, and a dependency mindset, significantly hinder the effectiveness of grassroots governance.

 

However, it is worth noting that the cadre group is not without its own demands and challenges. Concerning work, there is a genuine call to alleviate the burden at the grassroots, especially among grassroots cadres who harbor strong dissatisfaction and aversion to formalism and bureaucracy. Concerning income, the disparity between family earnings and expenses, coupled with the desire to uphold a dignified lifestyle, acts as crucial criteria for assessing cadre income levels. Particularly among the middle-aged cadre groups, the impact of real-life pressures is not to be overlooked, with a widespread presence occurences of housing- or mortgage-related stress.

 

In terms of motivation, some cadre members encounter issues of insufficient initiative or inaction, resulting in the erosion of the overall work enthusiasm and motivation, leading to the development of a sense of professional burnout. In terms of accountability, negative observable patterns, including a fear of making mistakes, a lack of responsibility, and a dependency mindset, significantly hinder the effectiveness of grassroots governance.

In the upcoming thirty years of China's modernization with Chinese characteristics, the three agricultural issues—agriculture, rural areas, and farmers—should not encounter setbacks; instead, they should be managed effectively. The crucial factor for rural areas to function as a stabilizing force, akin to a reservoir, in China's future modernization with Chinese characteristics lies in addressing the issue of farmers. The core issue lies in the farmers' future prospects, specifically whether farmers can move to urban areas and lead a decent life there, and whether those who fail in urban pursuits can return to and settle in rural areas.

 

The term "farmers" is an identity concept, generally referring to residents with rural household registration. Nowadays, rural students who have left their villages for college and farmers who have settled in urban areas still retain rural household registrations in large numbers, but they are no longer classified as “farmers”. Furthermore, depending on whether their primary interests remain rooted in the village and their engagement with rural social relations stays active, farmers can be categorized into two main groups: village-based farmers and non-village-based farmers.

 

The group of non-village-based farmer includes farmers who have moved to urban areas and rural migrant workers engaged in non-agricultural work. Despite participating in urban employment, private businesses, or other non-agricultural activities, they have not undergone complete urbanization and still lack stability in terms of jobs, residences, and social security in urban areas. Urbanization remains their aspiration and hope, while rural areas serve as their sense of belonging and a safety net.

 

On the other hand, village-based farmers live and reside in rural areas, engaged in agricultural production, secondary occupations, or non-agricultural work. They either retire or raise children in rural areas. Their primary interests and social relations are in the village, where they spend the majority of their time. They belong to the middle-income group in rural areas and are beneficiaries of existing policies. Consequently, they are highly satisfied with and supportive of the institutional policies in rural areas and the construction of small rural communities, exhibiting a conservative and stable political and social attitude.

 

As the primary force and key contributors to rural society, village-based farmers play a crucial role and fulfill essential functions in China's three modernization initiatives: Agricultural, Industrial, and National Defense Modernization. Their role and status in China's modernization strategy have become more prominent. The formulation and implementation of policies for rural society should emphasize fairness and follow a people-centered approach. The evolving demands of village-based farmers in the new era should be actively responded to, and they should be organized to participate in the rural revitalization process, ensuring their pivotal role as a stabilizing force in modernization construction.

With the market-oriented economic reforms of the 1980s, the market position of Chinese state-owned enterprises as major players gradually became more solidified, and their autonomy in production and operation continuously expanded. The functions related to providing public services decreased. These changes shaped the dual identity of state-owned enterprise employees: firstly, due to the unique ownership features of state-controlled enterprises, they are affiliated with the state political system. They enjoy a stable employment environment as a result of this affiliation while also undertaking political functions. Secondly, they become part of the framework of the market economy, facing pressures from market competition while fulfilling economic functions. The pre-existing institutional and policy dividends, along with social welfare, and legal status protection are gradually weakening.

 

After 2012, with the implementation of the "comprehensive deepening of reforms" policy by the Chinese government, the dual identity of state-owned enterprise employees became further reflected in the characteristics of their interest structure. Firstly, under the dual influence of the government's promotion of a new round of restructuring within state-owned enterprises and the gradual implementation of a market-oriented employment system centered on contract and based on job management, the overall scale of the workforce decreased by about 13% between 2012 and 2020. Secondly, driven by economic development and the promotion of the “enterprises empowerment strategy through talent” practice, the trend toward a younger, more educated, and technologically skilled workforce is increasingly evident. Lastly, influenced by market mechanisms, the remuneration for the workforce has significantly increased. Nevertheless, internal disparities widened by about 4% between 2013 and 2021, surpassing those of other employment groups within the political system.

 

Changes in the structure of interests further shaped the characteristics of social attitudes among state-owned enterprise employees. We have chosen social equity perception and social tolerance perception as indicators for social emotions, and social moral evaluation and assessments of adherence to laws as indicators for social cognition and behavior. According to the data collected from comprehensive surveys from 2015 to 2021 on the Chinese social situation, the social attitudes of state-owned enterprise employees exhibit the following characteristics: firstly, the overall trend was positive, but internal differences were becoming increasingly evident; secondly, the evaluation of their social attitudes was consistently lower than those of employed individuals in other political systems across different time periods; thirdly, their perception of social equity experienced significant fluctuation; fourthly, their perception of social tolerance was showing a trend of being stable and improving; lastly, their perceptions of the effectiveness of rule of law and moral governance in Chinese society vary.

 

Based on the characteristics of the interest structure and social attitude, the era characteristics of state-owned enterprise employees can be summarized in three aspects: firstly, the protective role of the political system remains evident, but this role has been weakened by the influence of market mechanisms. And, the potential social risks that the workforce needs to bear are increasing. Secondly, comprehensive deepening reforms have affected the original interest structure, causing interest differentiation. However, this differentiation is expected to gradually ease with improvements in income distribution and the social security system. Lastly, the legal status protection for state-owned enterprises is evident, but the workforce has not demonstrated sufficient recognition of the current corporate culture and core values of society. Strengthening internal social identity and corporate cohesion within state-owned enterprises is still necessary.

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In conclusion, state-owned enterprises, possessing dual political and economic attributes, encapsulate the main characteristics and changes in China's political and economic system reforms. How to bridge the tension between reform and the interests, attitudes, and behaviors of state-owned enterprise employees, and how to leverage this group's entrepreneurial spirit, are issues worth further exploration.

Through the experience of developing China's platform economy, the rapid and effective formation of digital production methods is inseparable from the fully developed production organization and coordination of the external environment. In fact, this process is achieved through a certain "outsourcing" governance mechanism. That is, during the rise of the Internet, Chinese government consciously adopted an inclusive and prudent strategy, allowing platform enterprises to explore methods that align with their own modes of production development. There were no restrictions on market and investment access. At the same time, there was an increasing demand for platform enterprises to employ various forms of self-regulation, taking on the responsibility for platform activities and risk management.

 

The term “platform outsourcing system,” as used in this article, originates from an examination of existing administrative outsourcing and administrative contracting systems. This theoretical framework suggests that, on one hand, the administrative outsourcing system is related to the internal outsourcing relationships between different levels of government. It exhibits characteristics of mutual cooperation and internal consistency across three dimensions: the distribution of administrative powers (central government's residual claim right), incentives (personnel and economic), and internal control (performance assessment). This establishes a management system that can be self-sustaining. On the other hand, administrative outsourcing is associated with internal decentralization issues within government organizations. Sometimes, due to insufficient state capacity, the administrative contracting system is adopted, entrusting a broad spectrum of administrative affairs to social organizations, such as ethnic groups and entities. Despite lacking formal administrative legitimacy, these entities effectively undertake extensive public management responsibilities.

 

Drawing from these two theoretical frameworks helps in understanding the gradually emerging platform outsourcing structure over the past five years. This structure, shaped against the backdrop of central-local decentralization with central government institutions taking the lead, addresses structural and governance issues in the digital economic market. Platform governance is increasingly resembling the traditional outsourcing process for public affairs (externally). Various levels of government departments, especially at the central level, demand that platform enterprises, particularly large platforms, collectively implement a comprehensive set of governance tasks for platform behavior. At times, they are seen as agents for hierarchical law enforcement, while at other times, platforms are granted significant discretion, and evaluations of their performance are based on outcomes.

 

The operational logic is as follows: First, regarding the distribution of governance power, regulatory authorities (central/local) possess the legitimacy to govern the internet, proposing specific governance tasks for platform companies to complete while allowing a certain degree of discretionary space. Second, from an economic incentive perspective, the rise of an “illegal” internet implies that the government imposes fewer market and investment access restrictions. Platform companies gain entry qualification through mutual competition, resulting in increased concentration among operators. Regulatory authorities permit platform expansion but require that risk control measures are implemented. Third, in terms of governance assessment criteria, regulatory authorities focus more on the effectiveness and outcomes of governance, placing less emphasis on the process. However, in critical areas, there is a gradual increase in new and detailed requirements. Fourth, to shape nationwide uniform rules, the central government departments increasingly make direct demands on large platform companies of national influence, rather than solely relying on regional governments for regulation in their respective jurisdictions.

 

The platform outsourcing system and the administrative outsourcing system reflects two different modes of production: digitalization and industrialization (or internet/grid). The two systems coexist, mutually influence and constrain each other, playing different roles in different fields. Both serve as leverage points for national governance in addressing the complexity of the social economy and the unified national market. They propose different governance solutions in areas such as data elements rights, credit governance, and infrastructure, warranting continued observation.